

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		Date
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials Date
1. ADCI		[Signature] 9/23
2. EXDIL		[Signature] 24 SEP 1982
3. DCI	Rec'd 27 Sept.	[Signature] 6 OCT 1982
4. ER		
5.		
Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	
REMARKS		

with NSC staff approval  
we have sent 1 copy to DDO.

14574

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name and symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
[Signature] / Executive Secretary	Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

STAT

## ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

9/23

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,  
building, Agency/Post)

Initials

Date

1.

DDO

2.

3.

4.

5.

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

## REMARKS

Please ensure no additional  
copies are made.  
Thls.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,  
clearances, and similar actions

	cy/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	D/EX SEC	Phone No.

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

STAT

NSDD 57

L-117

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

11/150/89

1/hold for ORMS.

Someone will come by to read. If document is required, we will make decision whether to dissem (initial limited dissem).

ORMS officer is in Key Bldg.

STAT  
STAT

STAT

~~SECRET~~No. NSDD 57COPY # 7  
CIA

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

## Notice

The attached document contains classified National Security Council Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law.

Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you will show or discuss information contained in the document only with persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.

Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.

## Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	
9/22/82		27 SEP 1982	25X1
9/23/82		6/13/83	
Bulph 82			
9/23			
9/23			
9/24			
1/2/83			

~~SECRET~~DCI  
EXEC  
REG

**SECRET**

Exemption Registry
82-12127

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90696

SECRET

September 22, 1982


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward the Horn of Africa  
(NSDD-57) (S)

The President has approved and signed NSDD-57 establishing policy for the Horn of Africa. (S)

Given the sensitive nature of the policies enumerated in this action, dissemination of the signed NSDD-57 will be extremely curtailed. Single copies will be forwarded to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Requests for copies should be made to the National Security Council Staff. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

Attachment: NSDD-57

SECRET

28 SEP 24 1982

**SECRET**

cy 7 of 10 copies  
CIA

~~SECRET~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 17, 1982

National Security Decision  
Directive 57

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS THE HORN OF AFRICA (S)

The Horn of Africa is important to the United States primarily because of its strategic location with respect to the Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia region. The objectives of U.S. strategy toward the Horn are:

- To gain and consolidate U.S. military access to regional facilities;
- To deter and counter attacks or destabilization efforts against friendly states;
- To improve the economic health and internal political security of friendly states;
- To work for the resolution of local conflicts; and
- To reduce and ultimately remove Soviet and Soviet-proxy presence and influence. (S)

In order to achieve these objectives, the U.S. shall pursue a comprehensive and coordinated strategy towards the countries and issues in this region. This strategy shall consist of the following specific elements:

With respect to Somalia:

- To consolidate our military access to Somali facilities by completing currently planned military construction projects.
- To enhance Somalia's ability to deter limited Ethiopian air and ground incursions and to enable Somalia to defend itself against Ethiopian/Libyan supported guerrilla attacks. This will require within the overall budget levels giving greater priority to security assistance for Somalia.
- To enhance deterrence of aggression against Somalia with other direct actions including a gradual increase in the frequency and level of military exercises in Somalia, avoiding direct involvement or commitment of U.S. combat forces in insurgencies or minor border conflicts.

SECRET~~SECRET~~

cy 7 of 10 copies  
CIA

~~SECRET~~SECRET

2

-- In the event of a full-scale invasion of Somalia, the U.S. may face the alternatives of permitting Somalia to fall or direct commitment of U.S. forces. For planning purposes, commitment of U.S. forces to defend Somalia will not be precluded.

-- In discussions with the Somalis, the security assurances given in conjunction with the 1980 access agreement are not to be exceeded; our security assistance to Somalia and other aspects of our bilateral relationship are to continue to be tailored to reduce Somali irredentist ambitions.

-- To use our assistance to Somalia as leverage to encourage Somali economic policy and political reforms in order to improve long-term prospects for economic and political security.

-- Our assistance is to support the government of Somalia as a whole and not exclusively the current leadership, in order to maximize our continuing influence as the political situation evolves. (S)

With respect to Sudan:

-- To continue the high priority now accorded to security and economic assistance for Sudan in order to enable it to defend against subversion from Libya and confront critical underlying economic problems.

-- To enhance military cooperation with Sudan, including military exercises and pursuit of a military access agreement.

-- To encourage Sudan to rely primarily on Egypt for direct support if needed in facing guerrilla and/or cross-border threats from Ethiopia and Libya; to assist by appropriate direct U.S. actions including military visits and exercises but avoid commitment of U.S. forces in insurgencies or minor border conflicts.

-- To discourage direct Sudanese cross-border actions against Ethiopia which might have the effect of escalating conflict and weakening Sudan's diplomatic position.

-- In the unlikely event of a full-scale Ethiopian/Libyan invasion of Sudan, the U.S. may face requests from Sudan and/or Egypt for direct assistance and combat support. For planning purposes, commitment of U.S. forces to defend Sudan will not be precluded.

-- To strongly encourage continued Sudanese economic reform and austerity measures with the objective of returning Sudan to a situation of economic solvency within a five year period. An interagency working group is directed urgently to

SECRET~~SECRET~~cy 7 of 10 copies  
CIA

~~SECRET~~SECRET

3

develop creative proposals for meeting Sudan's needs for the extended debt relief and increased capital inflows essential to the achievement of this objective.

-- Our assistance is to support the government of Sudan as a whole and not exclusively the current leadership, in order to maximize our continuing influence as the political situation evolves. (S)

With respect to Djibouti:

-- To accord sufficient priority in the budget process to increasing assistance flows to Djibouti in recognition of the major importance of Djibouti to our naval and air operations in the region.

-- To encourage the French to continue their primary role as supporters of Djibouti's security and economy. (S)

With respect to Kenya:

-- To maintain our broadly cooperative relationship with Kenya, including military activities, upgrading of Kenyan facilities and our security and economic assistance.

-- To work to reduce Kenyan sensitivity to our increased military supply and cooperation with Somalia by maintaining rising assistance levels, if possible within overall budget constraints, and by encouraging consolidation of Kenyan-Somali rapprochement.

-- To strongly encourage sound economic policies. (S)

With respect to Ethiopia:

-- To put the Ethiopian leadership on notice that Ethiopia's actions against Somalia and Sudan have crossed the line of conduct acceptable to the United States.

-- To take appropriate steps to bring pressure on Ethiopia to discourage Ethiopian-Libyan destabilizing activities as well as continuing Ethiopian-Soviet collaboration. Actions will include coordination of economic measures (including bilateral and multilateral assistance policies) with our European allies and parallel consultations with major friendly regional states including particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Interagency Group is to conduct periodic reviews of the progress of this action program.

SECRET

cy 7 of 10 copies  
CIA

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~SECRET

4

-- To seek to maintain our presence in Addis Ababa in recognition of its importance for intelligence-gathering on short-term Ethiopian/Libyan threats to our interests in the region and our long-term interest in restoring a position of U.S. influence in Ethiopia. (S)

With respect to the Ogaden dispute:


-- To continue to advocate a negotiated settlement to this dispute and seek openings for efforts at mediation.

-- To do nothing that would stimulate a resurgence of the Somali-supported insurgency in the Ogaden. (S)

With respect to the Eritrea conflict:

-- The U.S. has no current interest in an Eritrean settlement.

-- To avoid identification with the Eritrean insurgents, but continue to consult closely with Sudan and other friendly states (e.g. Saudi Arabia) in order to monitor the evolving status of this conflict. (S)

SECRET

cy. 7 of 10 copies  
CIA

~~SECRET~~